唧唧堂:SMJ 战略管理杂志2021年10月论文摘要

唧唧堂 2021-11-25 23:59

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解析作者 | 唧唧堂管理学写作小组: 亚楠
审校 | 唧唧堂管理学写作小组:Eric.J, 金喵喵
编辑 | 悠悠



1、竞争放大在解释持续性能异质性中的作用


研究摘要

本文引入了一个不确定性条件下长期资源动态的正式模型。该模型证明了竞争放大对于出现持续绩效异质性的重要性。在某些市场中,资源状况的微小差异往往会随着时间的推移放大成巨大的绩效差异。该模型预测,这种放大和由此产生的绩效异质性在公司竞争高度可扩展、承担高沉没成本、快速折旧和表现出强烈时间压缩不经济的关键资源的市场中是最大的。放大的出现是因为在这些市场中,优势公司往往比追随者有更强的投资动机。先前的理论很少关注这种竞争性互动在塑造长期资源动态方面的关键作用。


管理摘要

在某些市场中,竞争对手之间的绩效差异远大于其他市场。例如,在高科技市场中,只有一家或几家公司往往会产生很大的利润份额,而在公用事业中,许多不同的公司可能表现出相似的绩效水平。本文中的数学模型表明,市场中关键资源的特征对于该市场中的公司是否具有相似或非常不同的绩效水平起着重要作用。例如,对不受产能限制且贬值迅速的资源(例如创新技术)的竞争往往会促使优势企业扩大领先优势,随着时间的推移,这会导致资源位置的任何微小差异扩大为巨大的绩效差异。相反,容量受限且寿命长的资源(例如工厂)往往会导致绩效差异的衰减。 


Research Summary

This article introduces a formal model of long-term resource dynamics under uncertainty. The model demonstrates the importance of competitive amplification for the emergence of sustained performance heterogeneity. In some markets, small differences in resource positions tend to amplify over time into large performance differences. The model predicts that this amplification and the resulting performance heterogeneity are largest in markets where firms compete for critical resources that are highly scalable, carry high sunk cost, depreciate rapidly and exhibit strong time-compression diseconomies. Amplification emerges because in these markets an advantaged firm tends to have a stronger incentive to invest than a follower. Prior theories had paid little attention to the critical role of such competitive interactions in shaping long-term resource dynamics.


Managerial Summary

In some markets, performance differences between competitors are much larger than in others. For instance, in high-tech markets just one or a few firms tend to generate a large share of profits, while in utilities many different firms can exhibit similar performance levels. The mathematical model in this article suggests that the characteristics of the critical resources in a market play an important role in whether firms in that market will have similar versus very different performance levels. For instance, competition for resources that are not capacity-constrained and depreciate rapidly—such as innovative technologies—tend to induce advantaged firms to extend their leads, which over time causes any small differences in resource positions to amplify into large performance differences. Conversely, capacity-constrained and long-lived resources—such as industrial plants—tend to induce attenuation of performance differences.


论文原文:Wibbens, P. D. (2021). The role of competitive amplification in explaining sustained performance heterogeneity. Strategic Management Journal, 42(10),1769–1792.



2、接待新客人前打扫卫生:反腐败冲击后政治联系适应的政治路径依赖模型


研究摘要

我们开发了一个政治路径依赖模型,该模型将网络嵌入性视角和公司政治战略文献相结合,以解释当反腐败措施导致政府官员更替时,公司如何调整其政治联系。我们假设,虽然与被处置腐败官员有密切联系的公司可以从消除现有的政治联系(“清洁屋”)和与其继任者建立新的联系(“接待新客人”)中受益,但政治路径依赖使公司能够做到前者,但对他们做后者有所限制。当企业高度依赖政府,以及被处置的腐败官员拥有强大的政治权力时,这些影响就会被放大。2012 年至 2018 年中国反腐运动的证据为我们的理论预测提供了支持。


管理摘要

公司努力与政府官员保持联系是很常见的。有趣的是,当政治权力转移时,企业能否通过切断与失去权力的政客的联系并建立新的联系来“更新”他们的关系?我们的政治路径依赖模型表明它可能不是一个对称的过程。在公职人员因腐败起诉而下台和更替之后,与被罢免的腐败官员关系更密切的公司确实会更有动力和能力去消除现有的联系。然而,被罢免官员的继任者更有可能与这些企业保持距离,从而削弱企业与其建立新联系的能力。来自 2012 年至 2018 年中国反腐运动的经验证据支持了我们的预测。 


Research Summary

We develop a political path dependence model that integrates the network embeddedness perspective and the literature on corporate political strategy to understand how firms adapt their political connections when anticorruption efforts lead to the turnover of government officials. We posit that although firms that have close associations with ousted corrupt officials can benefit from both removing existing political connections (“cleaning house”) and developing new connections with their successors (“hosting new guests”), political path dependence enables firms to do the former but constrains them from doing the latter. These effects are magnified when firms are highly dependent on the government, and when the ousted corrupt officials have great political power. Evidence from anticorruption campaigns in China between 2012 and 2018 lends support for our theoretical predictions.


Managerial Summary

It is common for firms to strive to stay connected with government officials. Of interest is, when political power shifts, can firms “update” their connections by severing ties with politicians who fall out of power and building new ones? Our political path dependent model demonstrates that it may not be a symmetric process. After the downfall and replacements of public officials due to corruption indictments, firms that are more closely associated with ousted, corrupt officials will indeed be more motivated and able to remove existing connections. However, the successors of ousted officials will more likely distance themselves from these firms, thereby undermining the firms' abilities to build new connections with them. Empirical evidence from anticorruption campaigns in China between 2012 and 2018 supports our predictions.


论文原文:Jiang, H., Jia, N., Bai, T., & Bruton, G. D. (2021). Cleaning house before hosting new guests: A political path dependence model of political connection adaptation in the aftermath of anticorruption shocks. Strategic Management Journal, 42(10), 1793–1821.



3、哪些专利可用作贷款抵押品?专利外部技术联动的新颖性作用


研究摘要

专利抵押品是企业债务融资的一个重要方面。我们认为,在接受专利抵押品时,贷款人需要在过时风险和外部发明未经验证的风险之间取得平衡,这两者都与专利的外部技术联系有关。与旧的外部发明相关的专利有过时的风险,而与太新的外部发明相关的专利则面临外部发明未经验证的风险,因此我们认为与适度新的外部发明相关的专利更有可能被质押。我们进一步提出,这种曲线关系的转折点取决于借款公司的属性:专利资产的公司特异性和技术专业化领域。我们使用 107180 项美国半导体专利的数据发现的结果支持了这些主张。


管理摘要

专利抵押是债务市场的一项重要创新。那么,如何选择合适的专利作为抵押品是专利企业和金融机构接受专利作为抵押品的一个重要问题。我们的结果表明,与旧的外部发明相关的专利不太可能被质押,因为这些专利可能很快就会过时;与太新的外部发明相关的专利也不太可能被质押,因为这些专利可能被认为风险太大;而与适度新的外部发明相关的专利更有可能被抵押。我们进一步发现,如果借款公司的发明公司特异性较高,则贷方对未经证实的外部发明风险的担忧会变得更加突出,但如果借款公司专注于专利技术领域,则这种担忧就会变得不那么明显。


Research Summary

Patent collateral is an important aspect in the debt financing of firms. We argue that in accepting patent collaterals, lenders need to balance between risk of obsolescence and risk of unverified external inventions, both of which are related to patents' external technology linkage. Patents linked to old external inventions are subject to risk of obsolescence while patents linked to too new external inventions are subject to risk of unverified external inventions, and therefore we propose patents linked to moderately new external inventions are more likely to be pledged. We further propose the turning point of this curvilinear relationship depends on borrowing firms' attributes: firm-specificity of their patent assets and their technological specialization domains. Using data on 107,180 U.S. semiconductor patents, our results support these propositions.


Managerial Summary

Patent collateralization represents an important innovation in the debt market. Then, how to choose appropriate patents as collaterals is an important question for patenting firms and financial institutions accepting patents as collaterals. Our results suggest that patents linked to old external inventions are less likely to be pledged because such patents may become obsolete soon, patents linked to too new external inventions are also less likely to be pledged because such patents may be deemed too risky, and patents linked to moderately new external inventions are more likely to pledged. We further find that lenders' concerns on risk of unverified external inventions become more salient if borrowing firms' inventions are more firm-specific but become less so if borrowing firms specialize in the patents' technological domains.


论文原文:Zhang, Y. A., Chen, Z. E., & Wang, Y. (2021). Which patents to use as loan collaterals? The role of newness of patents' external technology linkage. Strategic Management Journal, 42(10), 1822–1849.



4、股东激进主义和企业自愿披露气候变化风险


研究摘要

本文探讨了在没有强制披露要求的情况下股东积极主义是否可以促使公司更多地披露面临的气候变化风险。我们发现环境股东激进主义增加了气候变化风险的自愿披露,特别是如果由机构投资者发起,进一步如果由长期机构投资者发起,则更是如此。我们还发现,在由环境股东激进主义引起了自愿披露气候变化风险的公司在披露后获得了更高的估值,这表明投资者重视公司对气候变化风险敞口的透明度。


管理摘要

气候变化给企业带来越来越大的风险。然而,尽管气候变化风险的重要性日益增加,但人们对公司面临的气候变化风险、这些风险的披露以及他们为管理和减轻这些风险采取的战略行动知之甚少。在这项研究中,我们研究了在没有强制披露的情况下,股东是否可以提高企业在气候变化风险方面的透明度。我们发现股东激进主义是有效的,特别是如果由长期机构投资者发起。我们还发现,在环境股东积极主义之后,股票市场对公司的气候风险披露做出积极反应,这表明投资者重视公司对气候变化风险敞口的透明度。 


Research Summary

This article examines whether—in the absence of mandated disclosure requirements—shareholder activism can elicit greater disclosure of firms' exposure to climate change risks. We find that environmental shareholder activism increases the voluntary disclosure of climate change risks, especially if initiated by institutional investors, and even more so if initiated by long-term institutional investors. We also find that companies that voluntarily disclose climate change risks following environmental shareholder activism achieve a higher valuation postdisclosure, suggesting that investors value transparency with respect to firms' exposure to climate change risks.


Managerial Summary

Climate change poses increasing risks to companies. Yet, despite the growing importance of climate change risks, little is known about companies' exposure to climate change risks, their disclosure of these risks, and what strategic actions they take to manage and mitigate these risks. In this study, we examine whether—in the absence of mandatory disclosure—shareholders can elicit greater corporate transparency with respect to climate change risks. We find that shareholder activism is effective, especially if initiated by long-term institutional investors. We also find that the stock market reacts positively to companies' climate risk disclosure following environmental shareholder activism, suggesting that investors value transparency with respect to firms' exposure to climate change risks.


论文原文:Flammer, C., Toffel, M. W., & Viswanathan, K. (2021). Shareholder activism and firms' voluntary disclosure of climate change risks. Strategic Management Journal, 42(10), 1850–1879.



5、关注你想要什么:CEO 与分析师企业绩效归因和 CEO 解雇


研究摘要

首席执行官 (CEO) 经常强调他们的战略选择是导致良好绩效结果的原因,从而对积极的公司绩效结果进行内部归因。我们调查了 CEO 任期内 CEO 内部绩效归因的动态后果。CEO 内部归因创造了一种期望,即在 CEO 的领导下,良好的公司业绩将继续存在。然而,当公司业绩转为负面时,财务分析师也会做出内部归因,指出 CEO 强调的战略是导致业绩下滑的原因。分析师的内部归因为董事会提供了一个合理的解释,让董事会怀疑 CEO 的领导效能,增加了被解雇的可能性。我们在面板数据集中发现强有力的实证支持我们的假设,该数据集跟踪新闻媒体围绕季度收益公告对 CEO 和分析师的采访。


管理摘要

虽然先前关于 CEO 被解雇的研究考虑了导致 CEO 被解雇的不同因素,但我们的研究强调了 CEO 自己的公共绩效归因所发挥的作用。我们的研究结果表明,当 CEO 将积极的绩效结果归因于他们的领导力时,金融分析师也更有可能将随后的负面绩效结果归因于他们的领导力,这反过来最终导致 CEO 被解雇。鉴于在较长时期内预测公司业绩的难度,CEO 们应该意识到,当他们将积极的业绩结果归功于自己时,他们可能会成为随后的寻求对消极业绩结果的解释的外部成员的指责对象。因此,我们的结果表明,CEO 可能会从更多的自我谦逊行为中获益。 


Research Summary

Chief executive officers (CEOs) often make internal attributions of positive firm performance outcomes by highlighting their strategic choices as the cause of favorable performance results. We investigate the dynamic consequences of CEO internal performance attributions along a CEO's tenure. CEO internal attributions create an expectation that favorable firm performance will continue under the CEO's leadership. When firm performance turns negative, however, financial analysts also make internal attributions, pointing to the strategies highlighted by the CEO as the cause of performance downfall. Analysts' internal attributions provide a board with a legitimate account casting doubt on the CEO's leadership efficacy, increasing the likelihood of dismissal. We find strong empirical support for our hypotheses in a panel dataset that tracks CEO and analyst interviews in news media around quarterly earnings announcements.


Managerial Summary

While prior studies of chief executive officers (CEOs) dismissal have considered different factors leading to CEO dismissal, our study highlights the role played by the CEO's own public performance attributions. Our results show that when CEOs attribute positive performance outcome to their leadership, financial analysts are also more likely to attribute subsequent negative performance outcomes to their leadership, which in turn ultimately leads to CEO dismissal. Given the difficulty of predicting firm performance over an extended period of time, CEOs should be aware that when they take credit for positive performance outcomes they may be setting themselves up for subsequent blame from external constituents seeking explanations for negative performance outcomes. Thus, our results suggest that CEOs may stand to gain from more self-effacing behaviors.


论文原文:Park, S. H., Chung, S. H. (B.), & Rajagopalan, N. (2021). Be careful what you wish for: CEO and analyst firm performance attributions and CEO dismissal. Strategic Management Journal, 42(10), 1880–1908.



6、同行公司的董事会设计和治理失败


研究摘要

我们的研究将董事会委员会作为董事会行动的关键决定因素。我们研究了在结构上将不同董事会委员会联系起来的董事——被称为多委员会董事(Multi-committee directors, MCD)——如何解释为什么一些董事会行动只是象征性的,而另一些则更具实质性。作为基准,我们认为董事会通常通过象征性地任命相对缺乏经验且不太可能产生实质性影响的新董事来回应同行公司的财务重述。相比之下,拥有审计提名 MCD 的董事会更有可能采取实质性行动,任命具有必要经验的新董事,以降低其未来财务重述的风险。我们使用涵盖 2001 年至 2014 年罗素3000公司的原始数据集将定性访谈和因果识别策略相结合。


管理摘要

委员会在董事会如何履行其治理职责方面发挥着核心作用。本研究表明,在某些条件下,将董事分配到多个董事会委员会可以提高治理绩效。具体而言,当外部事件将注意力集中在董事会的监督作用上时,将审计委员会和提名委员会联系起来的多委员会董事 (MCD) 的存在与随后更有经验董事的任命和未来财务重述及诉讼的可能性的降低有关。由于这些特定的董事会配置可能对治理有效性产生实质性影响,因此我们建议董事会领导在如何分配董事会委员会任务时慎重考虑,并将董事会委员会结构视为可以有效改善治理结果的有意的组织设计选择。 


Research Summary

Our study introduces board committees as a crucial determinant of board actions. We examine how directors who structurally link different board committees—referred to as multi-committee directors (MCDs)—explain why some board actions are merely symbolic while others are more substantive. As a baseline, we argue that boards in general respond to financial restatements at peer firms by symbolically appointing new directors who are relatively inexperienced and unlikely to have a substantive impact. In contrast, boards with audit–nomination MCDs are more likely to take the substantive action of appointing new directors with the prior experience necessary to reduce the risk of their own future financial restatement. We combine qualitative interviews and a causal identification strategy using an original dataset covering Russell 3000 firms from 2001 to 2014.


Managerial Summary

Committees play a central role in how boards carry out their governance responsibilities. This study shows that assigning directors to multiple board committees can improve governance performance under certain conditions. Specifically, when external events focus attention on the board's monitoring role, the presence of multi-committee directors (MCDs) that link the audit and nomination committees is associated with the subsequent appointment of more experienced directors and a reduction in the likelihood of future financial restatements and lawsuits. Because these specific board configurations can have substantive implications for governance effectiveness, we recommend that board leaders be deliberate in how they allocate board committee assignments and treat board committee structure as an intentional organizational design choice that can meaningfully improve governance outcomes.


论文原文:Gai, S. L., Cheng, J.-J., & Wu, A. (2021). Board design and governance failures at peer firms. Strategic Management Journal, 42(10), 1909–1938.



7、投资者对任命黑人高管和首席执行官反应的实证检验


研究摘要

作者调查了投资者对任命黑人高管的反应。结果表明,投资者的反应是:(1)对黑人 CEO 任命比白人 CEO 任命更消极,(2)对黑人高管团队(TMT)任命比白人 TMT 任命更消极,(3)对黑人 CEO 任命比对黑人 TMT 任命更消极,(4)对从公司外部提拔的黑人 CEO 任命比从内部提拔的黑人 CEO 任命更消极该公司。此外,事后分析显示,与任命拉丁裔或亚洲TMT高管相比,投资者对黑人高管的 TMT 任命反应更消极。我们的研究结果表明,任命黑人高管与投资者的反应之间存在负相关,我们希望这能激发未来对因果关系及其潜在解决方案的研究。


管理摘要

投资者对黑人 CEO 任命的反应比白人 CEO 任命更消极,对从公司外部提拔的黑人 CEO 任命比对从公司内部提拔的黑人 CEO 任命更消极。此外,与对白人、拉丁裔或亚洲高管的 TMT 任命相比,投资者对黑人高管的 TMT 任命反应更消极。


Research summary

The authors investigated investor reactions to the appointment of Black executives. The results indicate that investors respond: (1) more negatively to the announcement of Black CEO appointments than to White CEO appointments, (2) more negatively to the announcement of the Black top management team (TMT) appointments than to White TMT appointments, (3) more negatively to the announcement of Black CEO appointments than to Black TMT appointments, and (4) more negatively to the announcement of Black CEO appointments who are promoted from outside the firm than to the announcement of Black CEO appointments who are promoted from inside the firm. Moreover, the post-hoc analysis revealed that investors react more negatively to the TMT appointment of Black executives than to the TMT appointment of Latino or Asian executives. Our results show the negative association between the appointment of Black executives and investors' reactions, and we hope it sparks future research examining causal factors and their potential solutions.


Managerial summary

Investors react more negatively to the announcement of Black CEO appointments than to White CEO appointments, and more negatively to the announcement of Black CEO appointments who are promoted from outside the firm than to the announcement of Black CEO appointments who are promoted from inside the firm. Moreover, investors react more negatively to TMT appointments of Black executives than to TMT appointments of White, Latino, or Asian executives.


论文原文:Gligor, D. M., Novicevic, M., Feizabadi, J., & Stapleton, A. (2021). Examining investor reactions to appointments of Black top management executives and CEOs. Strategic Management Journal, 42(10), 1939–1959.




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